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Private Placements, Cash Dividends and Interests Transfer: 
Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms 
 
Abstract: In this paper, the relationship between private placements of common 
stocks and cash dividends for Chinese listed firms is investigated. It finds that Chinese 
listed firms pay more cash dividends after private placements than do those that are 
not involved in placements. Firms with large shareholders participating in private 
placements pay more cash dividends than those without large shareholders 
participation. These results indicate that the firms controlled by large shareholders 
have a high propensity for interests transfer in their cash dividend policies. 























    As a flexible and elastic way of equity refinancing, private placements have 
come to serve a function in resource allocation in capital markets. Since the 1990s, 
private placements have been widely used in public equity markets, such as those in 
the U.K. and U.S.  
On May 8, 2006, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued the 
“Guidance for share issuance”, which set out the foundation of private placements. 
Private placements thus become an official part of equity refinancing in the capital 
markets in China. Since then, ever-growing numbers of private placements have 
become one of the most important parts of equity refinancing in China, and are 
currently used more often than rights offering or public offerings by Chinese listed 
firms. 
Despite the prevalence of private placements, controlling shareholders and actual 
controllers of Chinese listed firms in private placements are vulnerable to market risk 
and price fluctuations. Consequently, the controlling shareholders and actual 
controllers are motivated to seek additional interests to compensate for the market risk 
and potential losses. A few recent studies have shown that there is interests transfer 
behavior operating in the issuance process of private placements (Cronqvist & Nilsson, 
2005; Baek et al., 2006). Today, the Chinese stock market is an emerging market, and 
private placements are in a rapid growth stage in China. Presently, legal regulation, 
supervision and examination policies are inadequate. Thus, the unique Chinese setting 
of equity refinancing provides some space for interests transfer for the firms’ 
controlling shareholders through these private placements. The institutional 
background and high ownership concentration, in particular, also provide an 
institutional setting in which the issuing objects of private placements are seeking 
additional benefits to compensate for the associated risk. These factors may lead to 
more serious interests transfer behavior in Chinese listed firms, in private placements, 





“Interests transfer” is defined as controlling shareholders transferring assets and 
interests out of an enterprise to pursue private benefits (Johnson et al., 2000). It 
expropriates the interests of small shareholders or external investors. Most studies 
have shown that cash dividends can alleviate the agency problem between large 
shareholders and small shareholders (Faccio et al., 2001; Klaus et al., 2003). However, 
because of the special institutional setting in China and the inadequacy of the relevant 
laws and regulations, controlling shareholders may use cash dividends to expropriate 
the interests of small shareholders. Indeed, according to prior studies, a cash dividend 
has been widely used as an interests transfer tool by large shareholders to expropriate 
the interests of small shareholders in China (Yuan, 2001; Lee et al., 2002; Chen et al., 
2003; Chen et al., 2003; Xiao, 2005; Deng et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2007; Xu et al., 
2009).  
Generally, Chinese listed firms raise large amounts of funds using equity 
refinancing to support new projects or expand the business operations. However, this 
refinancing method has also been used as an important tool by controlling 
shareholders to pursue their private benefits. Large shareholders then expropriate the 
interests of small shareholders through cash dividends (Liu et al., 2003; Zhang et al., 
2005; Yu et al., 2010; Deng et al., 2013). 
Prior studies have shown that large shareholders transfer the interests to 
themselves through high offer price discount rates, long suspension of listings, 
injection of bad assets, and earnings management (Chen et al., 2008; Wang et al., 
2010; Wu et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2008; Zhang et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2010; 
Zhang, 2010). In such cases, the Chinese listed firms immediately pay cash dividends 
after the placement. By paying the cash dividends, large shareholders can transfer a 
larger proportion of the available funds out of the firms. On the one hand, this reduces 
the amount of the funds available to support a new project or expand the scope of 
operations. Thus, there is a conflict with the general refinancing purpose of such 





pay a cash dividend, then it raises the question as to why they place shares through 
private placements to large shareholders in the first place. Indeed, it seems doubtful 
that the real motivation of the Chinese listed firms in such refinancing lies in raising 
capital for new projects or expanding the scope of operations. One possible reason is 
that they transfer interests out of the firms through private placements or improve 
actual control rights. This process is more beneficial for large shareholders. Via 
private placements and cash dividend payment meshing with each other after the 
placement, large shareholders can increase their shareholdings without paying the full 
market price. Chinese listed firms use extant cash flow to compensate for the risk of 
their shareholdings. The firms may share in the benefits of placing shares that do not 
bring real income or appreciation in current asset values. Accordingly, small 
shareholders’ interests decrease. The essence of this behavior can be regarded as an 
“interests transfer”. 
This paper extends previous studies on private placements as follows. First, it 
provides empirical evidence of the interests transfer problem, caused by cash 
dividends after a placement, which differs from Zhu et al. (2008), who illustrate the 
interests transfer phenomenon of a company using a low offer price along with a high 
cash dividend payment. Large shareholders transfer the interests, in cash dividends, to 
their pockets after the placement. Thus, they expropriate the interests of small 
shareholders. Second, the paper extends the interests transfer topic on private 
placements to consider dividend policy after a placement. Most prior studies on 
interests transfer focus on effects before or during the issuance process of private 
placements, including the mechanism of high offer price discount rate, long 
suspension of listing, injection of bad assets, and earnings management. Third, results 
of this study have empirical implications in the refinancing of private placements. 
Furthermore, it confirms that the refinancing of private placements has become a tool 
for controlling shareholders to pursue their private benefits and for large shareholders 






The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature 
review and hypothesis development. Section 3 explains the research design. Section 4 
presents the main empirical analysis. The final section provides conclusions. 
 
2. Related literature and hypothesis development 
2.1. Related literature  
La Porta et al. (1999) in a ground-breaking study document that ownership is 
commonly concentrated around the world, excluding the U.K. and U.S. Although 
ownership concentration avoids the agency problem between large shareholders and 
managers under ownership dispersion, in fact, it increases the opportunities for large 
shareholders to seek private benefits of control. Thus, it actually produces an 
additional agency problem between large shareholders and small shareholders 
(Shleifer et al., 1997). Johnson et al. (2000) describe this activity as “interests 
transfer” or “tunneling”. They suggest that this is a behavior of large shareholders, 
expropriating the interests of small shareholders. Other studies have explored the 
interests transfer problem of large shareholders from various perspectives, such as 
dividend policy (La Porta et al., 2000; Faccio et al., 2001), related transactions 
(Betrand et al., 2002; Bae et al., 2002; Cheung et al., 2006), and debt financing 
(Faccio et al., 2003; Aslan et al., 2008). Some studies have found that there is an 
interests transfer problem with large shareholders expropriating the interests of small 
shareholders in the issuance process of private placements. Cronqvist and Nilsson 
(2005) investigate the influence of control rights on equity refinancing in Sweden, 
finding that family controlled enterprises prefer to directionally place shares to family 
controlled members or to vote shares lower in order to avoid dilution of control rights. 
Baek et al. (2006) analyze the phenomenon of enterprise groups in Korea conducting 
interests transfer via private placements. They find that there is an interests transfer 





the major issues including diluting the equity of minority shareholders and a higher 
offer price discount rate for shares to the controlling shareholders. 
In China, the stock market has developed along with the reform of state-owned 
enterprises. The ownership of Chinese listed firms is highly concentrated, so that there 
is a pattern of large shareholders and small shareholders. Due to the inadequacy of 
relevant laws on investor protection and weak self-discipline, the agency problem 
between large shareholders and small shareholders is very serious. It has attracted 
ever-increasing attention around the world. Prior research have studied the interests 
transfer problem of large shareholders from different viewpoints, such as cash 
dividends (Yuan, 2001; Lee et al., 2002; Chen et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2003; Xiao, 
2005; Deng et al., 2007; Yu et al., 2010; Su et al., 2014), related transactions (Li et al., 
2005), and funds appropriation (Li et al., 2004). The agency problem of large 
shareholders has been discussed in the issuance process of private placements and 
interests transfer. First, there is an interests transfer problem in higher offer price 
discount rate in the issuance process of private placements. It has been found that the 
offer price, buying investors’ identity, and shareholdings of large shareholders are 
associated (Chen et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2010). Second, there is 
an interests transfer problem in that large shareholders choose a lower offer price 
through the choice of market timing and trade suspension to control the stock price 
before the placement. It has been found that large shareholders eventually realize 
interests transfer to themselves using a long trade suspension before the placement, 
pushing the stock price before the benchmark date, and placing shares to themselves 
at a lower offer price (Zhu et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2010). Third, there is an interests 
transfer problem when Chinese listed firms inject bad assets, manage earnings, and 
transfer wealth (Zhang et al., 2008; Zhang et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2010; Zhang, 
2010; Wang et al., 2010). Fourth, there is an interests coordination problem between 
large shareholders and small shareholders in the issuance process of private 





Co., Ltd., and suggest that the issuance process of a private placement with a lower 
offer price is coordinated with a cash dividend payment by this company. 
Overall, Chinese studies on the interests transfer problem in private placements 
have focused mainly on the lower offer price, long suspension of listing, injection of 
bad assets, and earnings management before or during the issuance process in private 
placements. However, few investigations have been reported on private placements in 
coordination with cash dividends from the perspective of the cash dividend after the 
placement. 
 
2.2. Hypothesis development 
Cash dividends play a key role in alleviating the agency problem between large 
shareholders and small shareholders (Faccio, 2001; Klaus, 2003). In developed 
countries, laws for investor protection and supervision mechanisms are well 
established; small shareholders may force management to distribute cash dividends to 
meet the cash demands of investors in the absence of a profitable investment project 
(Johnson et al., 2000). In China, investor protection laws, however, have not been 
fully established. Internal shareholders can reduce free cash flows by cash dividend 
payments, expropriating the interests of external shareholders. It has found that, for 
Chinese listed firms, the cash dividend policy precludes some investors from 
obtaining a fair share of the benefits, and that large shareholders often expropriate the 
interests of small shareholders through cash dividends after equity refinancing (Yuan, 
2001; Lee et al., 2002; Chen et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2003; Xiao, 2005; Lu et al., 
2005; Deng et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2007; Xu et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2003; Zhang et 
al., 2005; Yu et al., 2010). Given the profit-driven nature of controlling shareholders, 
they have a strong inventive to use any potential opportunity to maximize their 
benefits. 
There are three main issues in the successful implementation of private 





described below.  
First, compared with other refinancing mechanisms, large shareholders gain more 
private benefits by paying a cash dividend after a placement. This activity has an 
impact on small shareholders’ interests. The interests of internal investors, such as 
large shareholders, can be affected by the market reaction. With regard to competing 
firms, firms in private placements are more dominant in terms of growth, profitability, 
and operating performance. Large shareholders increasing their shareholdings through 
private placements will gain in both the long and short term. They gain from their 
shareholdings increasing in the long term and gain additional compensation from cash 
dividends. Meanwhile, because the behavior pattern of external investors typically 
does not change much, the market reaction is good for the internal investors. It 
enables the compensation and prospective benefits of the public offerings to be shared 
by the market. However, the behavior pattern of external investors in a public 
offerings can easily change. As the uncertainty of the market reaction increases, the 
benefits uncertainty of the internal investors also increases. 
Second, there is a hidden interests transfer with a cash dividend after a placement. 
Small shareholders, however, accept it readily. In the placement year, firms pay a 
cash dividend immediately, distributing their interest to all shareholders, with the 
result that the cash dividend payment is a seemingly legal public benefit. A generous 
dividend policy allows investors to gain some return on their investment. Large 
shareholders purchase new shares using cash or assets, and then put some of the 
money back in their pockets through the cash dividend, as part of the return on their 
investment. The cash dividend is distributed in accordance with share holdings. Both 
large shareholders and small shareholders gain some return on their investment. The 
large shareholders’ increased shareholdings lead to a stronger control position without 
much extra cost. Small shareholders expect a return on their investment, even if it 
means a large shareholder gains a lot of cash through a cash dividend, but relative to 





stock market, nevertheless, a cash dividend payment is equated with good 
performance. Firms paying cash dividends can enhance their good impression with 
regulators and the public. Thus, the choice of a cash dividend payment to gain private 
benefits of control also helps to establish a good image. 
Third, relative to other refinancing mechanisms, the offer cost of a private 
placement is typically low. There is no requirement for profitability in private 
placements. Private placements provide more space for large shareholders’ 
opportunistic behavior with regard to grabbing money. Private placements do not 
require paying a high offer cost. Moreover, it can be relatively flexible regarding large 
shareholders’ payments, in that they can choose to inject assets, asset replacements, or 
cash. There is no limit on the cash flow to distribute. Usually, firms manipulate 
earnings management in the year preceding a placement (Zhang, 2010). After a 
placement, the firm directly improves the distribution proportion of cash dividends, 
which has been in retained earnings for one or more years before the placement. 
For small shareholders, there is a self-learning mechanism, in theory, in that small 
shareholders can discover the tactics of large shareholders in expropriating their 
interests through studying and investigating firm behavior over the long term. Why 
then are small shareholders willing to hold shares in listed companies rather than 
selling them after they have uncovered the interests transfer tactics of large 
shareholders?  
It is well known that if small shareholders do sell their shares en masse, then 
large shareholders would be expected to suffer larger damage to their benefits over 
the long term. Thus, large shareholders try to reduce interests transfer behavior in 
expropriating the interests of small shareholders. It also makes large shareholders and 
small shareholders form an equilibrium game regarding the small shareholders’ 
benefits loss.  
However, given the unique Chinese institutional background, massive selling is 





transfer becomes a general behavior, small shareholders are not in the game with a 
particular listed company but rather with the market. That is, they do not really have a 
better choice, and the only way out is to leave the market. Thus, they do not gain 
much benefit from selling their shares. Second, small shareholders tend to focus on 
short-term interests. It is better for them to gain their share of a cash dividend than 
nothing. Even if small shareholders expect that large shareholders will transfer 
interests through a cash dividend after a placement, they continue to hold their shares. 
Small shareholders’ interests may be expropriated by a cash dividend after a 
placement, but it is not a complete failure, at least. Third, the demonstration effect 
causes small shareholders to have strong expectations of a capital gain. For small 
shareholders, they rely on the bid-ask spread in the secondary market to gain part of 
their investment return. Large shareholders purchasing common stock in private 
placements lead the market to believe that the listed companies have optimistic 
perspectives. The demonstration effect causes small shareholders to have favorable 
expectations of a stock price increase, so the motivation to sell en masse after a cash 
dividend payment and placement is not obvious, at least. Fourth, the actual effects of 
the self-learning mechanism depend more on market conditions, good or bad, and 
especially market transparency. The unique Chinese governance structure makes 
asymmetric information a serious issue, causing the self-learning mechanism for 
investors to malfunction (Shay, 2004). For those large shareholders purchasing 
common stock in private placements, the price of institutional investors purchasing 
common stock in private placements is higher than theirs. The profitability of the new 
stock is not guaranteed, and they also need to pay the illiquidity cost. Additionally, 
because the shares of the institutional investors are mostly social public shares, they 
bear pressure from fund holders to share bonuses, so that they expect more cash than 
common shareholders, and they especially hope that an immediate cash bonus will 
alleviate cash flow pressure from the stock falling in a bear market. Thus, institutional 





Thus, to grab extra profits, large shareholders use favorable terms in private 
placements and then pay cash dividends after a placement. In this case, the first 
hypothesis proposed is: 
Hypothesis1. Chinese listed firms pay more cash dividends after private 
placements than those that are not involved in placements. 
In family enterprises, large shareholders prefer private placements rather than 
public offerings to maintain controlling benefits without the dilution of controlling 
rights (Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2005; Baek et al., 2006). Generally, ownership 
concentration is prevalent in China. It is difficult for small shareholders to effectively 
supervise the behavior of large shareholders. The large shareholders can manipulate 
the offer price and timing. Although institutional investors participate in private 
placements, some degree of conspiracy between the institutional investors and large 
shareholders seems reasonable. The laws of investor protection are not strong in 
China. The large shareholders’ opportunistic behavior produces an interests transfer 
problem in private placements. Prior studies have shown that large shareholders 
transfer interests to themselves through high offer price discount rate, long suspension 
of listing, injection of bad assets, and earnings management (Chen et al., 2008; Wang 
et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2008; Zhang et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2010; 
Zhang, 2010). 
Chinese listed firms recognize rights parity between large shareholders and small 
shareholders after the non-tradable reforms. The large and small shareholders’ 
benefits begin to converge. The behavior of large shareholders in expropriating small 
shareholders begins to ease. With the advantages of the high ownership concentration, 
large shareholders can make their firms pay more cash dividends (Bradford et al., 
2013).  
When purchasing common stock in private placements, large shareholders are 
then restricted from selling their shares for at least three years. The longer this lock 





in an increasing stock price. They still face the market risk of price fluctuations in the 
lock period. The large shareholders cannot trade their shares temporarily. Other 
methods for transferring corporate resources suffer from strict regulations, via the 
market and law. Cash dividends after a placement are within the scope of legal control. 
For large shareholders, the impulse of control benefits induces them to choose cash 
dividend payments to expropriate the interests of small shareholders. Through cash 
dividends after a placement, large shareholders may recover, effectively, most of the 
cost of the equity in various ways, and also reduce their market risk and losses due 
price fluctuations during the lock period. The controlling rights of large shareholders 
are strengthened without fully paying the corresponding cost. Thus, the second 
hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis2. Firms with large shareholders participation in private placements 
pay more cash dividends than firms without large shareholders participation. 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1. Sample formation  
3.1.1. The sample firms 
An initial sample of 438 private placements of common stocks by public firms 
during the period 2006 to 2009 on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges is 
obtained from CSMAR and WIND database. Using a matching firms approach, the 
relationship between private placements and cash dividends for Chinese listed firms is 
examined. In order to avoid the confounding effect including initial public offerings, 
rights offering, public offerings and convertible bonds, the research sample is selected 
if it meets the following requirements: 
1. The firms must have issued A-shares. 
2. Financial companies are not included (e.g. Banks or Security Company). 
3. The firms have not undergone a private placement three years before or after, 





After screening private placements according to these criteria, a final sample 
containing 221 firms is determined.  
 
3.1.2. Matching firms 
   The purpose is to examine the cash dividend changes in Chinese listed firms 
because of private placements or large shareholders participating in private 
placements. Thus, a corresponding matching firm is sought for each sample firm to 
control for other factors that may influence cash dividend policies. The benchmark for 
selecting a matching firm is based on the previous year’s data for the sample firm. 
The matching firm for each sample firm is selected based on: 
1. In addition to meeting the conditions for the sample firm selection, the firm 
has not carried out a private placement, initial public offerings, rights offering, public 
offerings, or convertible bonds during the sample period, and there is no special 
treatment or particular transfer. 
2. The firm is in the same industry with an asset size within 20% to 200% of the 
sample firm. Then, the firm picked is the one with profitability (the ratio of earnings 
before interest and taxes/the total assets) closest to the sample firm. 
3. If unable to find the ‘right’ matching firm according to the second condition, 
the test is loosened to the firm’s asset size being within 70% to 120% of the sample 
firm, and the firm picked is the one with profitability closest to the sample firm 
without considering its industry. 
4. Candidate matching firms have not accessed the private placement market for 
three years before the placement and have not carried out a rights offering, public 
offerings, or convertible bonds. 
According to the above selection criteria, excluding the missing value and 
extreme value firms, ultimately there are 416 firms which include 221 firms in private 








Table 1  
Yearly distribution of private placements.  
 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total  
Participant 13 42 53 34 142 
Non-participant 11 30 16 22 79 
Total 24 72 69 56 221 
The sample of 221 private placements of common stocks by public firms during the period 2006 to 
2009 on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges is chosen. 
 
3.2. Models and variables 
In recent years, difference in difference method (DID)1 has been widely used in 
testing the impact of the policy reform and effect, such as tax bill (Guber et al., 1994; 
Maki, 2001); labor law of disabilities and child labourer (Gruber, 2000; Jolls, 2004), 
and European drunken driving bill (Albalate, 2008). Chinese scholars also analyze the 
fee and tax reform (Zhou et al., 2005), economic efficiency of area delegating power 
(Shi et al., 2007), and economic effects of the value added tax transformation policy 
(Nie et al., 2007). 
Private placements in China have increased gradually year by year (as is shown in 
table 1). There may be a cash dividend payment difference between before and after a 
placement. There may also be a cash dividend payment difference between the 
placement firms and those that are not involved in private placements
2
. This is similar 
to a “natural experiment”. The placement firms are used as a “treatment group”. 
Those are not involved in private placements are considered the “control group”. Thus, 
a model is created for the first hypothesis. 
                                                           
1
 Difference in differences (sometimes “Difference-in-Differences”, “DID”) is a technique used in econometrics that measures 
the effect of a treatment at a given period in time. It is often used to measure the change induced by a particular treatment or 
event, though it may be subject to certain biases (mean reversion bias, etc.). In contrast to a within-subjects estimate 
within-subjects estimate of the treatment effect (that measures the difference in an outcome after and before treatment) or a 
between-subjects estimate of the treatment effect (that measures the difference in an outcome between the treatment and control 
groups), the DID estimator represents the difference between the pre-post, within-subjects differences of the treatment and 
control groups. 
2 
The company does not conduct any equity refinancing. In that, the refinancing method has been used as a tool for controlling 
shareholders to pursue their private benefits and for large shareholders to expropriate the interests of small shareholders using 
cash dividends after a placement. So choosing the company that does not conduct any equity refinancing is as a “control group", 
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In Equation 1, Dps is a cash dividend payment per share, and Dpsjzc is a cash 
dividend payment ratio that is cash dividend per share/net assets per share. ‘Pipe’ is a 
dummy variable for private placements; in private placements, it is one, and in firms 
with no private placements, it is zero. X indicates the control vectors that affect a firm 
that pays a cash dividend. including: size is the natural logarithm of the total asset size 
of the firm on the end of the year; lev is the total liabilities/the total assets on the end 
of the year; roa is the earnings/the total assets on the end of the year; growth is the 
increment of the total assets on the end of the last year/the total assets on the end of 
the year; lc5 is (the first five large shareholders’ shareholding rate - the first large 
shareholder’ shareholding rate)/the first large shareholder’ shareholding rate; qdps is 
the cash dividend on the end of the last year; cash is the operating cash flow net per 
share on the end of last year; eps is earnings per share on the end of the last year. μt is 
a timing dummy variable. Year0 is a timing dummy variable. When the placement 
year is one, and else is zero. Year1 is a timing dummy variable. When the first year of 
private placements is one, and else is zero. Year2 is a timing dummy variable. When 
the second year of private placements is one, and else is zero. Year3 is a timing 
dummy variable. When the third year of private placements is one, and else is zero. αi 
is a characteristic that does not change over time. 
Similarly, to test the second hypothesis, another model is created
3
.  
    0 1 2( c )i t i t i t i t t i i tD p s D p s j z p a r t i c i p a t e X                (2) 
In Equation 2, with the exception of the ‘participate’ and timing dummy variables, 
the variables are the same as in Equation 1. ‘Participate’ is a dummy variable for the 
firm whose large shareholder participates in private placements; when large 
                                                           
3
 There are several reasons for using the difference in difference method again. First, private placements in China have increased 
gradually year by year; large shareholders participate in placements; so large shareholders participating in placements have also 
increased gradually year by year. Second, there is a corporate governance difference between before and after large shareholders 
participation. In addition, there is a cash dividend payment difference between large shareholders participating in private 
placements and those without large shareholders participation. So, the economic effects of the event can be identified. Finally, 





shareholder participates in private placements, it is one, and where large shareholder 
does not participate, it is zero. μt is a timing dummy variable. Year0 is a timing 
dummy variable. When the year of large shareholder participation is one, and else is 
zero. Year1 is a timing dummy variable. When the first year of large shareholder 
participation is one, and else is zero. Year2 is a timing dummy variable. When the 
second year of large shareholder participation is one, and else is zero. Year3 is a 
timing dummy variable. When the third year of large shareholder participation is one, 
and else is zero. 
 
Table 2   
Summary statistics.  
This table reports the summary statistics of variables. Dps is a cash dividend payment per share, and 
Dpsjzc is a cash dividend payment ratio that is cash dividend per share/net assets per share. Pipe is a 
dummy variable for private placements; in private placements, it is one, and in firms with no private 
placements, it is zero. Participate is a dummy variable for the firm whose large shareholder participates 
in private placements; when large shareholder participates in private placements, it is one, and where 
large shareholder does not participate, it is zero. Size is the natural logarithm of the total asset size of 
the firm on the end of the year. Lev is the total liabilities/the total assets on the end of the year. Roa is 
the earnings/the total assets on the end of the year. Growth is the increment of the total assets on the 
end of the last year/the total assets on the end of the year. Lc5 is (the first five large shareholders’ 
shareholding rate - the first large shareholder’ shareholding rate)/the first large shareholder’ 
shareholding rate. Qdps is the cash dividend on the end of the last year. Cash is the operating cash flow 
net per share on the end of last year. Eps is earnings per share on the end of the last year. 
Variables N Mean Std Median Minimum Maximum 
Dps 2490 0.0753 0.138 0.0100 0 1.868 
Dpsjzc 2490 0.0226 0.0404 0.0028 0 0.534 
pipe 2490 0.202 0.402 0 0 1 
participate 1326 0.2353 0.4243 0 0 1 
size 2490 19.67 0.754 19.57 17.99 23.77 
lev 2490 0.528 0.198 0.532 0.0183 1.939 
roa 2490 0.0256 0.0986 0.0284 -2.7463 0.5235 
qdps 2490 0.0758 0.129 0.0177 0 1.672 
growth 2490 0.781 0.733 0.616 0 10.18 
lc5 2490 0.186 0.126 0.164 0.0002 0.572 
cash 2490 0.0884 0.630 0.0248 -4.165 4.847 








3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents that the mean Dps of cash dividend payment per share is 0.075 
yuan, the maximum is 1.868 yuan, and the minimum is zero. The mean Dpsjzc of 
cash dividend payment ratio is 0.023, the maximum is 0.534, and the minimum is zero. 
This indicates that there are more differences among Chinese listed firms that pay 
cash dividends. Some firms paying cash dividends are relatively very high. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Univariate analysis 
4.1.1. Cash dividend payment and cash dividend payment ratio: the sample firms 
and the matching firms                           
Table 3 presents the changes between cash dividend payment and cash dividend 
payment ratio before and after the placement. From Table 3, we can see: 
First, the mean Dps of cash dividend payment per share for two years before the 
placement is 0.0618 yuan; the mean Dps of cash dividend payment per share for two 
years after the placement is 0.1125 yuan. This difference is statistically significant 
(t=-4.220). The mean Dpsjzc of cash dividend payment ratio for two years before the 
placement is 0.0165; the mean Dpsjzc of cash dividend payment ratio for two years 
after the placement is 0.0319. This difference is also statistically significant (t=-4.478). 
Thus, there is a significant difference in cash dividends between before and after the 
placement; Chinese listed firms pay more cash dividends after a placement than 
before. Relative to the matching firms that have not carried out any refinancing, the 
mean Dps of cash dividend payment per share for the two years before the placement 
and two years after the placement are 0.0630 and 0.0704 yuan, respectively; the mean 
Dpsjzc of cash dividend payment ratio for the two years before the placement and two 
years after the placement are 0.0180 and 0.0209, respectively. These difference are 
not statistically significant（t=-0.635 and t=-0.9245). Thus, there is no significant 
difference in the matching firms paying cash dividends for two years before the 





Second, the difference in difference method shows that the difference between 
the sample firms and the matching firms is statistically significant（t=-2.784 and 
t=-2.846). The sample firms paying cash dividends before and after the placement 
differ significantly with respect to the matching firms. 
Third, the sample firms paying cash dividends and the matching firms before the 
placement are not significantly different (the difference of the mean Dps is 0.0012 
yuan, t=0.119; the difference of the mean Dpsjzc is -0.0015, t=-0.632). However, 
there are more sample firms paying cash dividends after the placement than the 
matching firms (the difference of the mean Dps is 0.0421 yuan, t=3.086; the 
difference of the mean Dpsjzc is 0.0110, t=2.691). This indicates that before the 
placement the sample firms and matching firms paying cash dividends are not 
different, buy they are significantly different after the placement. This proves 
tentatively our expectation of the first hypothesis. Thus, it will seem to be a tool for 
large shareholders to gain private benefits, rather than funds for new projects or to 
expand the scope of operations. 
 
Table 3   
Sample firms and matching firms.  
 






















































Dps is a cash dividend payment per share, and Dpsjzc is a cash dividend payment ratio that is cash 
dividend per share/net assets per share. Before placement: up to and including two previous years; 
After placement: up to and including two following years. 







4.1.2. Cash dividend payment and cash dividend payment ratio: large shareholders 
participate and non-participate 
 
Table 4   
Large shareholders participate and non-participate.  
 
 
























































Non-participate are those without large shareholder participation. Before participate is two years 
before large shareholders participating in placements. After participate is two years after large 
shareholders participating in placements. Dps is a cash dividend payment per share, and Dpsjzc is 
a cash dividend payment ratio that is cash dividend per share/net assets per share. 
***Indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. 
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level. 
 
Table 4 presents the changes between cash dividend payment and cash dividend 
payment ratio of large shareholders participating in placements and those without 
large shareholders participation. From Table 4, we can see: the mean Dps of cash 
dividend payment per share for two years before large shareholders participating in 
placements is 0.0620 yuan, the mean Dps of cash dividend payment per share for two 
years after large shareholders participating in placements is 0.1246 yuan. This 
difference is statistically significant (t=-3.927). The mean Dpsjzc of cash dividend 
payment ratio for two years before large shareholders participating in placements is 
0.0163, the mean Dpsjzc of cash dividend payment ratio for two years after large 
shareholders participating in placements is 0.0360. This difference is also statistically 
significant (t=-4.167). The difference of the mean Dps and Dpsjzc for two years 
before large shareholders no participation and two years after large shareholders no 
participation are 0.0283 yuan and 0.0073, respectively. These differences are 





shareholders participation paying cash dividends also change between two years 
before and two years after. The difference and difference method indicates that the 
difference between large shareholders participating in placements and those without 
large shareholders participation are -0.342 and -0.0124, respectively; and they are 
statistically significant (t=-1.659 and t=-1.695). It indicates that large shareholders 
participating in placements pay more cash dividends than those without large 
shareholders participation. It proves preliminary the second hypothesis. 
 
4.2. Empirical results 
4.2.1. Private placements and cash dividends 
Table 5 presents the result about the influence of private placements on cash 
dividends. Whether the dependent variable is cash dividend payment (Dps) or cash 
dividend payment ratio (Dpsjzc), the coefficients of ‘pipe’ in the model 1 and 3 are 
0.0237 and 0.0244 respectively. These are significantly greater than zero, indicating 
that private placements result in a significant increase in cash dividends after a 
placement. To test the time change trend that private placements affect cash dividends, 
we examine the placement year and the year after the placement that affect cash 
dividends in model 2 and 4. In model 2 and 4, the coefficients of the placement year 
are significantly positive in the placement year. However, after the placement year, 
cash dividends are reduced year by year. Indeed, cash dividends in the second year are 
negative and not significant. From the view of all the samples in model 2 and 4, all 
estimates of pipe increase clearly. The estimates of ‘pipe’ from model 1 to 4 indicate a 
significant influence on cash dividends after a placement. These show that Chinese 
listed firms pay more cash dividends after the placement than do those that are not 
involved in private placements. This is consistent with our expectation of the first 
hypothesis. 
 
4.2.2. Large shareholders participation and cash dividends 





cash dividends. Whether the dependent variable is cash dividend payment (Dps) or 
cash dividend payment ratio (Dpsjzc), the coefficients of ‘participate’ in model 1 and 
3 are 0.0282 and 0.0096, respectively. These are significantly greater than zero. These 
show that large shareholders participating in placements lead to increase cash 
dividends. To test the time change trend in whether large shareholders participating in 
placements increase cash dividends, we examine that the placement year and the year 
after large shareholders participation in placements affect cash dividends in model 2 
and 4. The results indicate that firms with large shareholders participating in 
placements then pay more cash dividends than those without large shareholders 
participation. Cash dividends are increased significantly in the placement year. 
However, cash dividends do not significantly decrease from the first to second year, 
and they increase significantly in the third year. From model 1 to 4, the coefficients of 
‘participate’ are statistically significant. These show that firms with large shareholders 
participating in placements pay more cash dividends than those without large 
shareholders participation. This is consistent with our expectation of the second 
hypothesis. 
What is noticeable is that. In table 5, the coefficient of ‘pipe’ in the placement 
year is positive significantly in order to test the time change trend private placements 
affect cash dividends that in the placement year and the year after the placement. In 
table 6, the coefficient of ‘participate’ in the placement year is positive significantly in 
order to test the time change trend in whether large shareholders participating in 
placements affect cash dividends. These indicate that firms controlled by large 
shareholders have a significant interests transfer preferences in their cash dividend 
policies.  
4.3. Robustness test 
To further investigate the robustness of the results, firms which halt private 
placements are chosen as control sample. Syl is chosen as growth index. Zycash that 





robustness analysis tests the influence of either private placements or the participation 
of large shareholders on cash dividends. 
 
Table 5   
Regression of private placements affecting cash dividends.  
 
 
Dps  Dpsjzc 



































































































































































R-squared 0.09 0.09  0.08 0.09 
Obs 2490 2490  2490 2490 
This table reports the coefficients for private placements affecting cash dividends. With the exception 
of the timing dummy variables, other variables are the same as in Table 2. Year0 is a timing dummy 
variable. When the placement year is one, and else is zero. Year1 is a timing dummy variable. When 





the second year of private placements is one, and else is zero. Year3 is a timing dummy variable. When 






 indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 6  
Regression of large shareholders participation affecting cash dividends. 
 
 
Dps  Dpsjzc 





































































































































































R-squared 0.07 0.08  0.09 0.10 
Obs 1326 1326  1326 1326 
This table reports the coefficients for large shareholders participation affecting cash dividends. With 
the exception of the timing dummy variables, other variables are the same as in Table 2. Year0 is a 
timing dummy variable. When the year of large shareholder participation is one, and else is zero. 





else is zero. Year2 is a timing dummy variable. When the second year of large shareholder 
participation is one, and else is zero. Year3 is a timing dummy variable. When the third year of large 






 indicate statistical significance at the 




Robustness test of the influence of private placements on cash dividends.  
 
 
Dps  Dpsjzc 







































































































































R-squared 0.05 0.06  0.07 0.09 
Obs 1409 1409  1410 1410 
The table reports the coefficients for the influence of private placements on cash dividends. With the 
exception of syl and zycash, other variables are the same as in Table 2. Syl is chosen as growth index. 
Zycash that is free cash flow per share is chosen as capital operation ability.
 ***
, ** and * indicate 






Table 7 shows the robustness test about the influence of private placements on 
cash dividends. From model 1 to 4, results show the influence of private placements 
on cash dividends are significantly positive, suggesting that the cash dividends are 
increased after private placements. It further supports the first hypothesis. 
 
Table 8   
Robustness test of the influence of large stockholders participating in placements. 
 
Dps  Dpsjzc 






































































































































R-squared 0.05 0.06  0.07 0.08 
Obs 1409 1409  1410 1410 
The table reports the coefficients for the influence of large stockholders participating in placements. 
With the exception of syl and zycash, other variables are the same as in Table 2. Syl is chosen as 











indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Table 8 shows there is the robustness test about the influence of large 
stockholders participating in placements. Results from model 1 to 4 show the 
influence of participation of large stockholders on private placements are significantly 
positive, suggesting that large stockholders participating in placements pay more cash 
dividends than do those without large shareholders participation. It further supports 
the second hypothesis. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Herein, the relationship between private placements of common stocks and cash 
dividends for Chinese listed firms is investigated. With a specific sample of Chinese 
listed firms in private placements from 2006 to 2009 on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges. It finds that Chinese listed firms pay more cash dividends after the 
placement than do those that are not involved in placements. Firms with large 
shareholders participating in placements pay more cash dividends than those without 
shareholders participation. The results indicate that the firms controlled by large 
shareholders have a high propensity for interests transfer in their cash dividend 
policies. 
Large shareholders have controlling rights advantages and internal motivations 
for interests transfer. There are few effective constraints to paying cash dividends 
after a placement. There is a veneer of legitimacy when large shareholders expropriate 
small shareholders through providing a cash dividend after a placement. The cash 
dividend payment gradually becomes an interests transfer tool for large shareholders 
to grab extra profits. It is fully beyond the CSRC’s purpose that the refinancing 
qualification of a Chinese listed firm is linked to the level of dividend payment to 
protect the small shareholders. Therefore, regulators should deal with this emerging 
phenomenon by improving the laws and regulations. The CSRC should actively push 





large shareholders in paying cash dividends after a placement. Then, a cash dividend 
payment can serve as a tool for investors to share in benefits fairly. The CSRC needs 
to effectively protect the rights of small investors and promote healthy coordinated 
development in the capital markets. 
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